autochthony to monopolize the limited resources of the region.

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In the 1960s, I used to teach about Man the Hunter. It was the only theory of human evolution I knew, and it fit well into the concept of the human domination of nature, which then seemed so natural. One of my students complained to me about Man the Hunter, emphasizing that it was only a theory. He was right, but also wrong—as a devout Christian, his historical human framework featured Adam.

Then came the discovery in 1974 of small-brained Lucy, our australopithecine forebear who, 3.2 million years ago, was only three-and-a-half feet tall. Her little bones laid out in skeletal order on a table did not resonate with “hunter” at all, unless roots, clams, and fruit were her prey; her male peers would have been larger than she, but still very small compared to us.

In Man the Hunted, Donna Hart (professor of wildlife conservation at the University of Missouri, St. Louis) and Robert Sussman (professor of physical anthropology at Washington University, St. Louis) discuss the life of our ancestors in detail, focusing mainly on the time period of Lucy, who lived about halfway through our evolution from ape-like ancestors about seven million years ago to ourselves. Lucy and her peers would have been preyed on by the ancestors of lions, tigers, leopards, wild dogs, hyenas, snakes, crocodiles, sharks, and even eagles—animals whose present-day descendants still kill a number of people each year. There were more than 100 extinct species related to hyenas alone.

The authors report that stone tools, but not weapons, have been found with fossil bones of human ancestors 2.3 million years old. Evidence for large scale [sic], systematic human hunting only appears about 60,000–80,000 years ago, after 99 per cent [sic] of the time over which humans evolved had elapsed. Humans began to eat meat regularly only with the advent of farming 10,000 to 15,000 years ago. Lucy’s fossilized remains do not have sharp, shearing teeth that reflect a meat diet, but incisors and canines that are small in relation to her large, blunt molars. The microwear on these molars indicates that she ate foods such as leaves, fruits, seeds, and tubers. Like other primates, she would seldom have access to animal protein. Her alimentary canal was undoubtedly suited for an omnivorous diet such as that enjoyed today by people and chimpanzees, feeding on whatever foods came to hand, neither specialized for eating leaves nor for consuming meat.

Hart and Sussman consider why there has been a bias toward the idea of protohominids being hunters more than forager–gatherers. Most academics come from a Judeo–Christian background, which valorizes the dominance of man [sic] over nature. Most have been men, and male scholars chose to write books and articles about the prehistorical prominence of their sex as represented by their hunting ability; they resisted the thought of women being important in society because they gathered edible vegetation, although we have known for four decades that some 60 to 90 percent of food used and collected by most modern human foragers in the tropics is still provided by women. The earlier significance of Piltdown Man (proven a fraud only in 1953) had predisposed scientists to think of our ancestors as having a large brain, which would enable them to become skilled hunters, long before one actually developed.

Where meat is concerned, we can think of our hominid ancestors at best not as hunters but as scavengers. Louis Leakey (Leakey and Ardrey 1971) recounts how he and his son, Richard, reenacted the possibility of scavenging on the plains of Africa. They took off their clothes, grabbed giraffe leg bones to protect themselves, and approached hyenas feasting on a zebra kill that lions had made. They were able to scare away and hold at bay the hyenas for about ten minutes while they hacked meat from the zebra. The hyenas were “furious,” Leakey reports.

Hart and Sussman have written a highly readable book, with jazz subtitles such as “Will the First Hominid Please Stand Up?,” “Before the Age of Ulcers,” and “My, What Big Teeth You Have!” Their argument that human beings and their predecessors, during almost the entire period of their evolution, have been preyed on rather than predators is entirely persuasive.

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In The End of the Soul, Jennifer Michael Hecht examines atheism in late-19th-century France through the lives and works of a number of eminent physical anthropologists. Hecht investigates the problems of early republican secularism through an examination of the Society of Mutual Autopsy, founded in 1876. The members of this society decreed that, after death, their brains would be dissected.
by surviving members of their group. The goal of these freethinking anthropologists was to prove the nonexistence of the soul and to demonstrate correlations between physical features of the deceased individual’s brain and supposedly corresponding mental characteristics of that same individual. During more than 30 years of existence, the society produced hardly any scientifically valuable findings while at the same time never giving up its initial grandiose ambitions. Hecht explains this seemingly irrational persistence through the religious function attributed to science in this group, interpreting the dissections as a secularized burial rite. The French anthropologists described in this book, who had discarded the idea of possessing an immortal soul, sought consolation in the hope that their otherwise meaningless death might at least contribute to the progress of science. In Hecht’s work, as is frequently the case, the concept of “secularization” implies a deficiency: The ersatz eschatology of scientific progress cannot fully replace the prospect of spiritual eternity because the dead individual eventually has not lived to see the earthly paradise that Enlightenment science has promised. The corresponding affect is one of bittersweet, brave resignation.

Most of the freethinking anthropologists described had originally been drawn to anthropology, not for love of anthropological knowledge as such but because anthropology seemed to provide them with a powerful conceptual armament for their struggle against religion. Many of them were politically engaged advocates of feminism and socialism. Paradoxically, these egalitarians meticulously studied and established biological differences between human beings. This anthropological knowledge came to be employed in the service of a laicized pastoral state engaged in what Michel Foucault has called “the bio-politics of the population.” In this context, Hecht provides a detailed and knowledgeable discussion of the emergence of demography and criminal anthropology, as well as race theory and eugenics, in which Georges Vacher de Lapouge played a key role. Lapouge had a strong impact on the eugenics movement in the United States as well as in Germany. Thus, the originally leftist and egalitarian project of the freethinking anthropologists eventually transmuted into a radically antiegalitarian rightist body politic.

In France, however, Lapouge remained a fringe figure. In Hecht’s account, racism is depicted as a marginal phenomenon in 19th-century French mainstream anthropology. Her narrative ends in an upbeat tone. Its secret hero is Léonce Manouvrier, who criticized the biological determinism predominant among his colleagues while maintaining a secular position. The sociologist Émile Durkheim and the philosopher Henri Bergson are presented as advocating related forms of “scientific indeterminism” as a response to the radical materialism of the freethinkers. After all, with Bergson’s life force and Durkheim’s notion of society, God and the soul return in a worldly guise. A post-materialist leftism comes to acknowledge and to speak in a secular vocabulary about the variety of once-religious needs allowing for indeterminacy, mystical experience, and social “spirit.”

Hecht’s discussion of this interesting subject matter is rich and thought provoking. However, her analysis might have profited from a more critical engagement with the notion of secularization. She provides ample evidence to back up her claim that certain aspects of the freethinking anthropologists’ activities and conceptions served as responses to questions that, in the eyes of the freethinkers, religion could no longer answer. Secularization has undoubtedly served as a necessary precondition of 19th-century anthropology. But these modern phenomena cannot be reduced to varying accidental forms of a transhistorically immutable substance. The idea of scientific progress, for example, cannot be satisfactorily explained as a secularized eschatology. It differs in its internal logic (the anticipated future is envisioned as the outcome of an immanent process of development rather than as a transcendent intervention) as well as in its origin—the overcoming of the unalterable, authoritative status of Aristotelian science (Blumenberg 1983). Furthermore, not only the responses but also the problems often undergo significant transformations. It seems arguable whether eschatology or soteriology are really universal and ahistorical “human needs,” as Hecht’s functionalist analysis suggests. This book would have profited from a more self-conscious exploration of its inherent tension between functionalism and historicism. Nevertheless, Hecht’s book is challenging and valuable. It is a must for those who are interested in the history of French anthropology. It would also be useful and engaging to those interested in the ethical and political dimensions of modernity.

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This is a collection of short chapters by Ian Hodder, a Selbstschrift or self-writing, as it were, of pieces published in various journals and edited volumes, or given at meetings, since 1998. He supplies brief introductions to the whole and to the four sections into which the 15 pieces are grouped.

The first section is about globalization and archaeology. Hodder says that transnationalism has fragmented archaeology and that this is generally a good thing. In his view archaeology does not speak with the authority that it used to have. This could be true in some ways. But, for example, my predecessors here at the University of Georgia—I am thinking of Robert Wauchope in the 1930s to 1960s and then Joseph Caldwell into the 1970s—represented a discipline unified mainly in the sense that there were so few practitioners (when Wauchope began the program at the university, he was the only professional archaeologist in the state).